Kant’s system of moral decision-making is…
- A deontological theory (the consequences of our actions never matter) based on rationally derived duties.
- We discover what these duties are by firstly formulating a maxim (the principle that we are thinking of acting on) e.g. should I make false promises? Should I tell the truth to a would-be murderer?
- The maxim is subjected to various tests. If it passes them it becomes an expression of what Kant calls ‘the categorical imperative’, a moral law that must be followed in all situations.
- Firstly, the maxim gets universalized. Does it retain its logical coherence when we do this?
- Making a false promise fails this test as the whole concept of making promises would be rendered meaningless.
- Is the maxim contaminated with selfishness? Are we failing to treat anyone affected by our action as a fellow rational being who is therefore worthy of our respect? Again, making a false promise would fail this test. We are treating someone as a ‘means to an end’ rather than as an ‘end in themselves’, according to Kant.
- Imperatives contaminated with selfish motives are always hypothetical e.g. If, as a shopkeeper, I want the reputation of my business to be preserved, I must give the correct change to this naïve boy who is making a purchase from my shop.
- But truth telling passes these tests. It is logically possible for everyone to be honest and if we are telling the truth we are always exhibiting respect to others.
- So telling the truth is a maxim that expresses the categorical imperative and is a law that can be observed by members of a ‘Kingdom of Ends’, a community of rational beings.
- Kant insists that maxims like this must be followed regardless of the situation e.g. we must tell the truth even to a would-be murderer who is asking us where someone they intend to kill is hiding.
- Adhering consistently to rational maxims will ensure that we eventually achieve the summum bonum (the highest good), probably in the afterlife when our virtue will be rewarded (though does this introduce a consequentialist form of motivation into Kant’s system?).